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ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose a novel easily reproducible technique
to attack the best public Face ID system ArcFace in different
shooting conditions. To create an attack, we print the rectan-
gular paper sticker on a common color printer and put it on
the hat. The adversarial sticker is prepared with a novel algo-
rithm for off-plane transformations of the image which imi-
tates sticker location on the hat. Such an approach confuses
the state-of-the-art public Face ID model LResNet100E-IR,
ArcFace@ms1m-refine-v2 and is transferable to other Face
ID models.
Index Terms— real-world, adversarial attacks, Face ID,
ArcFace.
1. INTRODUCTION
Last years face recognition systems based on deep learning
and massive training data provided a very high level of recog-
nition which outperforms human level of verification [1] as
well as identification [2].
In the beginning, only the big corporations could afford
training of the Face ID models on a huge amount of private
data (e.g. 200M of faces in [3]). Later, with the introduction
of quite big public datasets (mostly CASIA-WebFace [4] and
MS-Celeb-1M [5]) and new types of losses for training Face
ID models (in particular, angular-based losses: L-Softmax
[6], A-Softmax [7], AM-Softmax [8, 9] and ArcFace [10]),
even the models trained with public datasets by independent
researchers can be of the same (or similar) performance as
the proprietary models provided by large companies. For ex-
ample, the ArcFace (Insightface) solution is comparable with
Microsoft and Google models in such challenges as Megaface
[11, 12], NIST FRVT [13], and Trillion Pairs [14].
Nowadays, an increasing emphasis has been placed on the
adversarial attacks on deep neural networks. One of the rea-
sons for this is that adversarial attacks can be implemented
in the real world [25]. Recently, a form of adversarial at-
tack [15] on previous generation Face ID models has been
proposed [29, 42]. A drawback of the proposed methods
is that you need to cut out complex shape object from the
Fig. 1: A novel approach to attack the Facial Recognition
system. A sticker placed on the hat significantly reduces the
similarity to the ground truth class. Similarity to the ground
truth decreases by 0.592 on the left pair and by 0.429 on the
right pair.
paper. Another drawback is that shooting conditions (light-
ing, angle of the face and background) were fixed. In this
work we propose an easily reproducible (rectangular image,
printed and stuck to a hat) practical adversarial attack called
AdvHat on the best public Face ID model LResNet100E-IR,
ArcFace@ms1m-refine-v2 [16]. Demonstration of AdvHat is
depicted in Figure 1. The advantages of the proposed AdvHat
can be summarized as follows:
• We implemented a real-world adversarial attack on the
state-of-the-art public Face ID system using sticker on
the hat.
• The attack is easily reproducible. It is necessary to print
only a color rectangle.
• One attack works in different shooting conditions.
• We present a novel technique of the sticker projection
to the image during the attack to make it real-like.
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• The attack is transferable to other Face ID models.
The source code1 and video demonstration2 are available
on the Internet.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Firstly we review the adversarial attacks as our work uses the
concept of adversarial attack. Second, we touch the emerging
area of adversarial attacks in the real world, or in other words
practical attacks, since our work aims to construct an adver-
sarial attack working under conditions of the real world (as a
contrast to simple attack on pixels in the digital domain).
2.1. Adversarial attacks
The whole concept of adversarial attacks is quite simple: let
us slightly change the input to a classifying neural net so that
the recognized class will change from correct to some other
class (first adversarial attacks were made only on classifiers).
The pioneering work [15] formulates the task as follows:
• Minimize ||r||2 so as:
1. f(x) = cgt,
2. f(x+ r) = ct 6= cgt,
3. x+ r ∈ [0, 1]m,
where x ∈ [0, 1]m is an input to a classifier f , cgt — correct
ground truth class for x, ct 6= cgt — target class for x+r, r ∈
[0, 1]m — small perturbation to x that we need to construct.
Note that if we need to get the incorrect class, the attack is
called untargeted (or dodging in face recognition cases), and
if we need to get the specific predefined class ct, the attack is
called targeted (or impersonation in face recognition cases).
In [15] the authors propose to use a quasi-newton L-
BFGS-B method to solve the task formulated above. Sim-
pler and more efficient method called Fast Gradient-Sign
Method (FGSM) is proposed in [17]. This method suggests
using the gradients with respect to the input and construct-
ing an adversarial image using the following formula: x =
x+ sign∇xL(θ, x, cgt) (or x = x− sign∇xL(θ, x, ct) in
case of targeted attack). HereL(θ, x, y) is a loss function (e.g.
cross-entropy) which depends on the weights of the model θ,
input x, and label y. Note that usually one step is not enough
and we need to do a number of iterations described above
each time using the projection to the initial input space (e.g.
x ∈ [0, 1]m). It is called projected gradient descent (PGD)
[18].
It turns out that using momentum for the iterative proce-
dure of an adversarial example construction is a good way to
increase the robustness of the adversarial attack [19].
1https://github.com/papermsucode/advhat
2https://youtu.be/a4iNg0wWBsQ
All the aforementioned adversarial attacks suggest that we
restrict the maximum per-pixel perturbation (in case of image
as an input) i.e. use L∞ norm. Another interesting case is
when we do not concentrate on the maximum perturbation but
we strive to achieve the fewest possible number of pixels to be
attacked (L0 norm). One of the first examples of such attack is
the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [20], where
the saliency maps are constructed of the pixels that are the
most prone to cause the misclassification.
Another extreme case of attack for the L0 norm is a one-
pixel attack [21]. The authors use differential evolution for
this specific case, the algorithm which lies in the class of evo-
lutionary algorithms.
It should be mentioned that not only classification neural
nets are prone to adversarial attacks. There are also attacks
for detection and segmentation [22].
Another interesting property of the adversarial attacks is
that they are transferable between different neural networks
[15]. An attack prepared using one model can successfully
confuse another model with different architecture and training
dataset.
Usually, the adversarial attacks which are constructed us-
ing the specific architecture and even the weights of the at-
tacked model are called white-box attacks. If the attack has
no access to model weights then it is called a black-box attack
[23].
Usually, attacks are constructed for the specific input (e.g.
photo of some object). This is called an input-aware attack.
Adversarial attacks are called universal when one successful
adversarial perturbation can be applied for any image [24].
In this work we concentrate on a white-box input-aware
adversarial attack as the first step of our research.
2.2. Attacks in physical world
Although adversarial attacks are quite successful in the digital
domain (where we can change the image on the pixel level
before feeding it to a classifier), in the physical (i.e. real)
world the efficiency of adversarial attacks is still questionable.
Kurakin et al. demonstrate the potential for further research in
this domain [25]. They discovered that if an adversarial image
is printed on the paper and then shot by a camera phone it still
can successfully fool classification network.
It turns out that the most successful paradigm to construct
the real-world adversarial examples is an Expectation Over
Transformation (EOT) algorithm [26]. This approach takes
into account that in the real world the object usually under-
goes a set of transformations (scaling, jittering, brightness and
contrast changes, etc). The task is to find an adversarial ex-
ample which is robust under this set of transformations T and
can be formulated as follows:
• Find such argmaxr Eg∼TP (ct|g(x+ r)) so as:
1. f(x) = cgt 6= ct,
Fig. 2: Schema of the whole pipeline of the attack. First, we reshape sticker to a real-look form. Second, we project it on the face
images. Third, we transform images into the ArcFace input templates using slightly different parameters for the transformation.
Finally, we feed templates to the ArcFace, evaluate cosine similarities and TV loss. Thus we can get the gradients signs which
are used to modify the sticker image.
2. Eg∼T ||g(x+ r)− g(x)||p < ,
3. x+ r ∈ [0, 1]m,
where we use the notion of -vicinity in some Lp space.
One of the first papers adopting this idea is Adversarial
Patch [27]. In this work the authors use EOT for a set of
transformations including rotations and translations to con-
struct the universal patch for the ImageNet [28] classifier. It
is noteworthy that the authors do not concentrate on Lp norms
for perturbations where p ≥ 1 but on L0 norm.
Another work with the usage of L0-limited attacks pro-
poses to attack facial recognition neural nets with the adver-
sarial eyeglasses [29]. The authors propose a method to print
adversarial perturbation on the eyeglasses frame with the help
of Total Variation (TV) loss and non-printability score (NPS).
TV loss is designed to make the image more smooth. Thus it
makes an attack more stable for different image interpolation
methods on the devices and makes it more inconspicuousness
for human. NPS is designed to deal with the difference in dig-
ital RGB-values and the ability of real printers to reproduce
these values.
In general, most of the subsequent works for the real-
world attack use the concepts of L0-limited perturbation,
EOT, TV loss, and NPS. Let us briefly list them. In [30]
the authors construct the physical attack for the traffic sign
recognition model using EOT and NPS for making either ad-
versarial posters (attacking the whole traffic sign area) or ad-
versarial stickers (black and white stickers on the real traffic
sign). The works of [31, 32] use some form of EOT to attack
traffic sign recognition model too.
A number of works are devoted to adversarial attacks on
traffic sign detectors in the real world. One of the first works
[33] proposes an adversarial attack on Faster R-CNN [34]
stop sign detector using a sort of EOT (handcrafted estima-
tion of a viewing map). Several works used EOT, NPS, and
TV loss to attack Faster R-CNN, YOLOv2 [35] based traffic
sign recognition models [36, 37, 38].
Another interesting approach [39] uses the concept of
nested adversarial examples where separate non-overlapping
adversarial perturbations are generated for close and far dis-
tances. This attack is designed for Faster R-CNN and
YOLOv3 [40].
A few works are devoted to more complex approaches.
One of such works [41] proposes to use EOT, NPS, and TV
loss for fooling YOLOv2-based person detector. Another one
[42] is devoted to fooling the Face ID system using adversar-
ial generative nets (a sort of GANs [43]) where the generator
produces the eyeglasses frame perturbation.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
In the real-use scenario of the Face ID system, not every cap-
tured person is known. That is why predicted similarity with
the top-1 class should exceed some predefined threshold to
treat face as recognized.
The goal of our paper is to create a rectangular image
which can be stuck on the hat and induce Face ID system
to decrease similarity to ground truth class below the decision
threshold.
In order to achieve this goal we use an attack pipeline
which can be described as follows: 1) We apply a novel off-
plane transformation to the rectangular image which imitates
the form of the rectangular image after placing it on the hat.
Fig. 3: When we put a rectangular sticker on the hat, it bends
and rotates.
2) We project the obtained image on the high-quality face im-
age with small perturbations in the projection parameters to
make our attack more robust. 3) We transform the obtained
image to the standard template of ArcFace input. 4) We re-
duce the sum of two parameters: TV loss of the initial rect-
angular image and cosine similarity between the embedding
for the obtained image and the anchor embedding calculated
by ArcFace. A schema of the whole pipeline is illustrated in
Figure 2.
3.1. Off-Plain Sticker Transformation
We split transformations that occur during placing a sticker
on the hat into two steps: the off-plane bending of the sticker
and pitch rotation of the sticker. Both of these transformations
are illustrated in Figure 3.
We simulate the off-plane bending as a parabolic transfor-
mation in the 3d space which maps each point of the sticker
with initial coordinates (x, y, 0) to the new point with coor-
dinates (x′, y, z′). New points are placed on the parabolic
cylinder given by the equation z = a · x2. The origin of all
axes is placed in the middle of the sticker. After this transfor-
mation, the new z′ (off-plane) coordinate of each point of the
sticker is equal to a · x′2 and
x′ = a · (|x| ·
√
x2 +
1
4 · a2+
+
1
4 · a2 · ln (|x|+
√
x2 +
1
4 · a2 )−
1
4 · a2 · ln (
1
2 · a )).
This formula guarantees that the geometric length of the
sticker does not change.
To simulate the pitch rotation of the sticker we apply a 3d
affine transformation to the obtained coordinates.
We change the parabola rate and the angle of rotation a
little during the attack to make the attack more robust since
we can not evaluate exact values of these parameters.
3.2. Sticker Projection
We use Spatial Transformer Layer (STL) to project the ob-
tained sticker on the image of the face [44]. We slightly
change the parameters of the projection during the attack.
It is crucial to project sticker on the high-quality image of
the face. The image interpolation methods, which are applied
in the Face ID system and which create a standard template
of the face, use the values of neighboring pixels. That is why
if we project sticker onto the small face (which is fed to the
ArcFace input) then the RGB values on the sticker boundaries
differ from that in a real-use scenario since they use values of
face pixels too.
3.3. Final Transformation
We transform images with the sticker to a standard template
for ArcFace using STL. Same as before, we change transfor-
mation parameters a little during the attack.
3.4. Loss Function
We feed a batch of images obtained by using various parame-
ters to the ArcFace input. The first loss to minimize is a cosine
similarity between obtained embeddings ex and some anchor
embedding ea for the person:
Lsim(x, a) = cos(ex, ea)
We minimize a TV loss also concerning the reasons as
mentioned earlier. We formulate TV loss as follows:
TV(x) =
∑
i,j
(
(xi,j − xi+1,j)2 + (xi,j − xi,j+1)2
) 1
2
The final loss is the weighted sum of the aforementioned
losses:
Lfinal(x, a) = Lsim(x, a) + λ · TV (x),
where λ is a weight for the TV loss (1e − 4 in our experi-
ments).
We do not use NPS loss since it do not make an influence
in our experiments.
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We use an image of 400 × 900 pixels in our experiments as
a sticker image. We project the sticker image to a 600x600
image of the face and then transform it to the 112x112 image.
4.1. Attack Method
As stated earlier, we randomly modify images before feed-
ing them to the ArcFace. We construct a batch of generated
images and calculate average gradients on the initial sticker
using the whole pipeline. We can evaluate gradients in a
straight-forward way since each transformation is differen-
tiable.
Note that stickers on each image from the batch are the
same during one iteration. Only transformations parameters
are different.
Fig. 4: Examples of the adversarial stickers.
We use Iterative FGSM with momentum and several
heuristics that were efficient in our experiments.
We split our attack into two stages. During the first stage,
we use step value equal to 5255 and momentum equal to 0.9.
During the second stage, we use step value equal to 1255 and
momentum equal to 0.995. The weight of the TV loss is al-
ways equal to 1e− 4.
We use one fixed image with the sticker as a validation
where we set up all the parameters to the most real-like look-
ing values.
We interpolate the last 100 validation values by a linear
function using the least square method: after 100 iterations
for the first stage and after 200 iterations for the second stage.
If the angular coefficient of this linear function is not less than
zero then: 1) in the first stage we pass to the second stage of
the attack; 2) in the second stage we stop the attack.
4.2. Sticker Localization
To find out which place is the best for sticker position, we
make two experiments with the sticker localization. First, we
attack the image in the digital domain with a sticker placed on
various height above the eyez line. It turns out, that the lower
placement leads to the better validation values. Further, we
change the placement of the sticker after each iteration with
respect to the values of gradients on the spatial transformer
layer parameters. We limit the possible places for the sticker
to make it higher than the eyes. The sticker always moves
down to the eyes in our experiments.
Given the above, we put a hat and sticker at the lowest
possible position during the attack to achieve the best results.
Thus, we put on the hat in our experiments down to the eyes
(see Figure 1).
Some examples of typical adversarial stickers are depicted
in Figure 4. It looks like the model draws a raised eyebrows
on the sticker. According to the article [45], eyebrows are the
most important feature for the face recognition by a human.
That is why we believe that some sort of raised eyebrows ap-
pears on the sticker. The model draws the most important
feature of the face and eyebrows are raised because it is the
only reason which makes eyebrows higher than usual.
4.3. Testing Protocol
Since it is rather simple to attack a batch of images success-
fully using the sticker in the digital domain and since the main
goal of this paper is to attack the Face ID system in the physi-
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Fig. 5: Blue: Cosine similarities between anchor images and
images with a hat. Orange: Cosine similarities between an-
chor images and images with an adversarial sticker. Green:
Differences between aforementioned similarities. Red: The
top-1 similarity to the first 1000 classes from CASIA.
cal world, we concentrate only on the attacks in the real world.
Detailed studies of our approach applied to the digital domain
are out of the scope of this work.
At first, we evaluate the success and characteristics of the
attacks in the fixed conditions. During this experiment, we
use only full-face photos with uniform light. On the next step,
we research the robustness of our attack to different angles of
the face rotation and light conditions. Finally, we explore the
transferability of prepared attacks to other models.
We use first 1000 classes from the CASIA-WebFace
dataset as other classes of the recognizer. We do not intro-
duce percent of successful dodging attacks since the success
of the attack depend on the threshold which is used in the Face
ID system. It can significantly vary according to the purpose
of face recognition 3. Instead of the ratio of successes, we
explore the following values:
• Cosine similarity between ground truth embedding and
embedding for a photo with a hat. This is a baseline
similarity.
• Cosine similarity between ground truth embedding and
embedding for a photo with an adversarial sticker. This
is a final similarity.
• The difference between baseline similarity and final
similarity.
• The top-1 similarity to the 1000 classes from CASIA.
3A threshold for ArcFace varies from 0.328 to 0.823 according to the
results on IJB-B Still Images Identification test with FAR from 1e − 1 to
1e− 3.
Fig. 6: We make 11 extra photos for some persons to examine
the power of the attack in the various conditions. Poses from
1 to 11 are placed from left to right from top to the bottom.
4.4. Experiments with fixed conditions
We start with the experiments where all photos and real-world
testing are made in the same conditions. We evaluate the val-
ues for 10 people with different age and gender: four females
of age 30, 23, 16, 5 and six males of age 36, 32, 29, 24, 24,
8. We use 3 photos of each person to create an attack: a sim-
ple photo which we need to calculate the ground truth em-
bedding; a photo with the hat which we need to calculate the
baseline similarity and obtain the adversarial sticker; a photo
with the white sticker on the hat which we need to find pa-
rameters of the sticker transformations for this person. Then
we print the adversarial sticker for each person and make the
fourth photo with this sticker on the hat to obtain final values.
We use boxplot to show the distributions of the obtained
values (see Figure 5). As can be seen, adversarial stickers
significantly reduce similarity to the ground truth class. Only
one attack achieves similarity more than 0.2 in the real world
and the same attack achieves similarity to the top-1 class from
CASIA less than 0.2. Thus, similarity to the top-1 class from
the first 1000 CASIA classes is almost always bigger than
similarity to the ground truth although it is not the aim of
our attack. It is noteworthy that in most cases the adversarial
sticker reduces similarity to the ground truth on more than 0.5.
Both attacks that decrease similarity by less than 0.5 relate to
children under 10 years old. The baseline similarity is initially
smaller for children.
4.5. Experiments with various conditions
In order to examine the robustness of our approach to different
shooting conditions, we make 22 extra photos for 4 persons
from the first 10. These photos consist of 11 pairs. Each pair
is made in the same conditions. The first photo of each pair is
a photo in a hat that is used to evaluate baseline similarity. The
second photo of each pair is a photo in a hat with an adversar-
ial sticker that is used to evaluate the final similarity. 8 pairs
correspond to the different combination of head tilts (lean for-
ward, lean back, turn left, turn right) and 3 pairs correspond
to different lighting conditions. Examples of shooting condi-
Fig. 7: Baseline and final similarity for various shooting con-
ditions. Different persons are depicted with different colors.
Circle markers are used to show final similarity with adversar-
ial sticker and x markers are used to show baseline similarity.
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Fig. 8: Differences between baseline and final similarities of
one attack on different models. LResNet100E was used to
prepare the attack.
tions are depicted in Figure 6. It is worth noting that we use
stickers from the previous step without making new attacks.
The results are illustrated in Figure 7. Although final sim-
ilarity increases, the attack still works. We do not want to
jump to a conclusion since the testing set is crucially small
but we believe that our approach is robust to rotations of the
head that keep sticker visible.
We find out that the bigger area of the sticker on the photo
leads to the lower similarity. When the head leans forward,
the final similarity is still less than 0.2 and it gradually in-
creases while the head rises. Using better projective and ren-
dering technique and larger adversarial accessories (e.g. us-
ing of all area of the hat for the attack) can make you fully
unrecognizable for surveillance cameras.
4.6. Experiments with transferability
Finally, we examine the robustness of our attacks to other
Face ID models. The models have been taken from In-
sightFace Model Zoo [16]. These networks have differ-
ent architectures and they used different loss functions and
datasets for training in comparison to the LResNet100E-IR,
ArcFace@ms1m-refine-v2.
We use photos from the first experiment to evaluate sim-
ilarities: a full-face photo, a photo in a hat, a photo with an
adversarial sticker on the hat. We calculate the baseline and
final similarities for each of 10 persons. The differences be-
tween the baseline and final similarities for each model are
depicted in Figure 8 using boxplots.
We observe that our real-world attack behaves like a usual
adversarial attack in the digital domain. Although the strength
of the attack decreases, it still makes a person less recogniz-
able.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a novel method to attack the Face ID sys-
tem called AdvHat. Our method can be easily reproducible as
well as it can efficiently attack the best public Face ID model
in different shooting conditions. Experimental results verified
the robustness of our attack to the state-of-the-art Face ID sys-
tem ArcFace. In the future, we would like to apply our model
on state-of-the-art face detectors.
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